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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
OGDEN CITY, a municipal corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
WILLIAM P. STEPHENS and his wife, 
ISABELLE L. STEPHENS, and J. B. 
MARSH, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
11106 
This was an action brought by Ogden City, a municipal 
corporation, to obtain through eminent domain proceedings a 
parcel of property for a public off street parking lot. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court held that Ogden City had the lawful 
power and authority to take the property for a public off 
street parking lot to be used in conjunction with properties 
the city had acquired to the East and West of the subject 
property. 
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A jury trial was held September 28, 29 and October 2 
' 196 7, whereupon a verdict was returned for the defendants 
William P. Stephens, Isabelle L. Stephens and J. B. Marsh 
and judgment was entered accordingily. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have the Court determine that it 
does not have jurisdiction to hear this aweal or, if necessary, 
seeks to have this court affirm the trial court's decision that 
Ogden City had the lawful power and authority to acquire 
the property through eminent domain proceedings and to af-
firm the verdict which was returned. 
FACTS 
The facts as set forth in the appellants' brief which 
relate to the parking lot, the improvements thereon, and the 
historical background of this lawsuit are essentially correct. 
To present a more realistic picture in appellants' fourth 
paragraph of the facts, it should be pointed out that the so 
called "rental units" on the Stephens' property had been con-
demned by the city as health and fire hazards several years 
before the razing, (Tr. 87, 114), and had also been uninhabit-
ed during that period. (Tr. 95, 122). In the last paragraph 
it was the defendants who moved for the new trial, (R. 41), 
while the plaintiff moved for a Judgment Notwithstanding 
the Verdict in reference to the severance damages and lease-
hold amounts, ( R. 45), although the record does reflect that 
the Court granted plaintiff's motion for new trial on both 
phases of the lawsuit, land and lease. (R. 44). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS FILED OVER 
ONE MONTH FROM THE ENTRY OF JUDG-
MENT AND, THEREFORE, THIS COURT 
LACKS JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN THIS 
APPEAL. 
The trial concluded and the jury reached its verdict on 
September 2, 1967. Judgment on the verdict in open court 
was filed and docketed on October 4, 1967, by the Weber 
County Clerk in favor of the Stephens, (R. 68), and in favor 
of J. B. Marsh. (R. 69). 
The Judgment on Verdict and Final Order of Condemna-
tion were signed by Judge John F. Wahlquist on October 11, 
1967, and docketed respectively as entry number 15776, 
(R. 67), and 17775, (R. 66), on October 13, 1967, which 
started the time running in which to appeal. These documents 
were sent to the defendants' attorney, (R. 71), and the 
amount as provided by the Final Order of Condemnation was 
paid to the Clerk of the Court. 
U tab Rules of Civil Procedure., in Rule 7 3 (a), specifies 
how and when an aµpeal is to be taken as follows: 
"When an appeal is permitted from a District Court to 
the Supreme Court, the time within which an appeal may 
be taken shall be one month from the entry of judgment 
appealed from unless a shorter time is provided by 
law, ... " 
The only exception provided is excusable neglect of a 
party to learn of the entry of judgment. 
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The defendants' attorney, upon receipt of the Judgment 
and Final Order of Condemnation on October 10, 1967, re-
quested certain additions to the interest payments, payments 
for use of parking stalls used by the city, and additional wit-
ness fees. The city's response indicating certain monetary 
adjustments was forwarded to the defendants' attorney dated 
October 1 7, 196 7. ( R. 7 5). The Notice of Appeal filed by 
the defendants was dated December 5, 196 7, and filed Decem-
ber 6. 1967. (R. 74). 
A recent Utah case, In Re Estate of Ratcliff, 19 Utah 
2d 346, 431 P 2d 5 71, ( 196 7), involved an appeal wherein 
the appellant had until April 1, 1966, to file the notice of 
aweal. The notice was received by the District Court Clerk 
on April 1, additional copies of the notice were received on 
April 4, and the filing fee paid on April 8, 1966. The Court 
there stated: 
"Since the notice was filed more than one month after 
the entry of judgment on the order appealed from (Rule 
73 (a), U.R.C.P., this court lacks jurisdiction to enter-
tain the appeal, and is therefore compelled to order a dis-
missal thereof." 
It is submitted that defendants were well aware that 
judgment had been entered, that they had received copies of 
the judgment, that the Final Order of Condemnation reflect-
ed interest payments on the judgment of 8 % per annum from 
October 2, 196 7, that the interest payments were made, that 
defendant's attorney forwarded to the city questions relating 
to the judgment and received a response thereto, and on this 
basis defendants had knowledge of the entry of judgment, 
that the neglect in filing the appeal was not excusable and 
this court, therefore, lacks jurisdiction and should not enter-
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tain this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT II 
THE PROPERTY TAKEN WAS FOR A PUBLIC 
PURPOSE AND 'WAS NECESSARY FOR AN IN-
TEGRATED PARKING LOT FOR THE USE OF 
THE PUBLIC. 
The legislature has enacted legislation providing for the 
use of eminent domain proceedings in a variety of public 
necessity uses among which are parking lots as is set forth 
in U.C.A., 10-8-8, as follows: 
"They (referring to cities) may lay out, establish, open, 
alter, widen, narrow, extend, grade, pave or otherwise 
improve streets, alleys, avenues, boulevards, sidewalks, 
parks, airports, parking lots or other facilities for the 
parking of vehicles off streets, public grounds, and pedes-
trian malls and may vacate the same or parts thereof by 
ordinance. 
Town of Perry v. Thomas, 82 Utah 159, 22 P 2d 343, 
(1933), involved an eminent domain proceeding for the pur-
pose of developing a public street from what had been a pri-
vate lane. The court, as suggested by the appellants, felt 
that based upon the legislative enactment it could inquire as 
to whether the use of the property was one authorized by 
law, that is, a public use, but in so doing determined that: 
"The phrase 'public use', as used in the eminent domain 
statute has been given a liberal interpretation by this 
court." 
The court further held: 
"Under powers thus delegated to municipal boards the 
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necessity, expediency, or propriety of opening a public 
street or ·way is a political question, and in the absence 
of fraud, bad faith or abuse of discretion the action of 
such board will not be disturbed by the courts." 
In the situation at hand, there is no allegation• of fraud 
' bad faith or abuse of discretion. The Ogden City Council 
determined that an integrated public parking lot was needed 
and passed a resolution to acquire the remaining parcel of 
property through eminent domain proceedings. The resolu-
iton was passed pursuant to the legislation giving cities the 
authority to establish facilities for the parking of vehicles 
off streets. 
Bowman v. Kansas City, 361 Mo. 13, 233 SW 2d 26, 
(1950), provides a good summary of the reasons why off 
street parking has become considered a public use, and the 
property required subject to eminent domain proceedings. The 
court there pointed out, in part, as follows: 
"The stipulation of facts shows that some 23 states have 
passed enabling legislation authorizing municipalities to 
acquire and operate off street parking facilities for a 
fee. . . It is common knowledge that during the last 20 
years, there has been a very great increase in the number 
of motor vehicles. . . Traffic congestion has become an 
acute problem in many of the cities and towns in this 
state .... We take judicial notice of the fact that off 
street parking tends to facilitate traffic and avoids 
hazards to life and property." 
"The matter of the control of such motor vehicles when 
entering or leaving public highways, their movement on 
the highways, the parking of such vehicles on the high-
way or on public areas provided off the highway and the 
regulation and control of motor vehicle traffic .generally 
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is referable to the police power, as being directly con-
nected with public safety and welfare. This police power 
may be delegated by the state." 
"We hold that the purposes proposed to be carried into 
effect by the ordinance in question are public purposes. 
Similar views have been expressed by the courts of other 
states." (Giving numerous citations). 
"The acquisition of land for and the establishment and 
operation of public off street parking stations or garages 
by the defendant city being for a public use and for pub-
lic purposes, the fact that such stations will compete with 
private enterpises is not material or decisive." 
Although not as inclusive, a similar result was reached 
by the court in City of Whittier v. Dixon, 24 Cal. 2d 664, 151 
P 2d 5, (1944), wherein the following statements were made: 
"Respondent contends that public parking places are 
not public improvements. The Legislature, however, has 
expressly authorized the acquisition of parking places to 
serve the public, and the legislation is valid so long as it 
serves some public purpose. (Giving several citations}. 
Just as public streets can be used for the parking of 
motor vehicles, property can be acquired for the same 
use. Moreover, public parking places relieve congestion 
and reduce traffic hazards and therefore serve a public 
purpose." 
With the increase in the number of automobiles and their 
use, it is necessary to make the required provisions to handle 
the parking of them particularly in our expanding metropoli-
tan areas. The Utah legislature wisely determined that off 
street parking was necessary and was a public use and the 
Ogden City Council saw fit to implement that use for the 
public citizens of Ogden City. 
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The Stephens' property was required for an integrated 
off street parking lot as set forth in paragraph 6 of the Find-
ings of Fact, and paragraph 2 of the Conclusions of Law , 
( R. 70), as follows: 
6. "The said ,properties which have been purchased by 
Ogden City have a frontage on Grant Avenue, on Lincoln 
A venue, and on a public alley extending along the south 
border of said properties which also borders the south 
boundary of the Stephens properties herein, however, the 
alley is of such a nature, particularly as to width, that 
it would be impossible for the defendants in the opera-
tion of an integrated parking lot to control the ingress 
and egress of the portion west of the Stephens' property 
without tthe acquisition of the said property." 
2. "That said action is legal as consistent with the 
greatest iPUblic good and least private harm." 
ARGUMENT 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED 
THE OPINION TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIFF'S 
EXPERT WITNESSES. 
This point and its ramifications opens the field to ques-
tion the basis of any statement made by any expert during 
the trial. 
In approaching a general comparison of appraisers, one 
of the requisites is a general knowledge of real estate values 
within the particular area involved. Disregarding the prop· 
erty owner, Mr. Stephens, who gave no valid basis for his 
8 
appraisal, it is interesting to note from the transcript, how 
knowledgable each expert was in regard to the particular 
area. 
"Q. (To Raymond Fletcher). (Tr. 215). Would you 
say that the value of real estate in the 25th Street 
area has increased since 1946, the last 21 years? 
A. I would say yes, but I really have nothing to base 
that on. All sales on 25th Street in 1946 as against 
196 7, I couldn't give you any proof of it. My reaction 
is yes, I think they have increased. 
Q. And this reaction, you would give me, would be 
based on real estate values generally, and not par-
ticularly 25th Street, is that correct? 
A. Yes, that is correct. 
"Q. (To Harley McDowell). (Tr. 230). Prior to 
the appraisal you made on this particular property 
have you made any appraisals in commercial downtown 
Ogden, in the six years preceding that time? 
A. I had not. 
Q. You were in Ogden at that time? 
A. Yes, I was. 
Q. In 1946? 
A. Yes. 
Q. OKay. 
A. I have been here various times since then but not 
in an appraiser capacity in the city limits. 
Q. Did you make appraisals on 25th Street when you 
were here in 1946? 
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A. Sir, I can't remember. 
"Q. (To Lawrence Taylor). (Tr. 252). And, how 
long have you been making appraisals in this particular 
area? 
A. About 34 years. 
Q. (Tr. 266-B). What is the history of land value 
in the 25th Street area, what has it been over the last 
20 years? 
A. They have been depreciating in value every year, 
possibly the last few years they have gotten so low 
they can't go down much more. 
Q. And, in reference to the Federal Building, would 
you say that dramatically changed real estate value on 
the Grant Avenue side opposite from it? 
A. No, it did not." 
The plaintiff's second witness had been making ap-
praisals in Ogden for some 14 or 15 years. (Tr. 312). 
The income approach to determine value was not used by 
the plaintiff's experts since they felt that the parking lot was 
not developed sufficiently to give a sufficient basis on which 
to predicate an income analysis. In addition, they felt that 
the locations of the parking lots in the retail district, that 
were partially being subsidized by the merchants, could not 
logically be used for income comparisons. (Tr. 262, 266-B, 
309). 
The defendants' experts used the income approach, Mr. 
Fletcher giving the most weight to this approach. (Tr. 189). 
However, to arrive at his conclusion he used income figures 
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supplied by Mr. Stephens. (Tr. 200, 201). These figures 
were identical to those supplied by Mr. Stephens in his an-
swer number 10, in the Anwers to Interrogatories. (R. 21). 
His income tax returns, ( Def's. Exh. 23), reflected quite 
another figure. By mathematical computation, using the dif-
ference in the two, Mr. Fletcher's income analysis, based on 
the income tax return figures, would have resulted in an ap-
praisal price of $24,080.67. 
These figures, however, were not the only basis used by 
Mr. Fletcher. He compared other parking lots near the retail 
business district of Ogden, not only for income analysis but 
for his market approach or comparable sales. 
"Q. (To Mr. Fletcher). (Tr. 197). I think you stated 
that the main basis of this appraisal was based upon 
the income approach. Is that correct? 
A. That is right. 
Q. To substantiate your income figures, do you know, 
I presume you had some basis is that right? 
A. I do. 
Q. And, where did you obtain those particular 
figures? 
A. The projected rental income was based on rental 
received at six lots in the nearby vicinity. 
Q. And where was the closest lot?, 
A. As I recall, the closest one was the Lancaster ramp 
on Kiesel, however, it is a little different type facility 
being a ramp, partially covered, as opposed to our 
open lot. 
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Q. And, would you in comparing parking lots, what 
would you say were the factors that were most crucial 
in determining the value or the rate charged? 
A. I think location is the most important item by far. 
The physical facility, of course, enters into it, but the 
location is your number one. 
Q. And, did you determine the proportion of daily 
rentals obtained as compared to monthly rentals ob-
tained on those lots? 
A. No, I was not able to get that information. 
Q. Other than the computations and figures based 
upon these parking lots, did you use any other figures 
to determine the income that might be obtained from 
the Stephen's parking lot. 
A. No, I based it on this market comparison of what 
is currently or was currently charged for downtown 
parking space. 
Q. (Tr. 216). Hasn't all the four you testified to as 
comparable, don't they have one entrance where they 
are controlled where one goes in and one comes out? 
A. Well, most of the others. 
Q. Used as parking operation only? 
A. Frankly all of them are controlled, yes, entrance 
and exit. Very often one channel will be used for 
either purpose." 
Mr. Harley McDowell also put weight on the income 
approach giving it equal value to the market analysis or com-
parable sales, (Tr. 224), but in so doing all comparisons were 
with lots having an attendant, and with one exception bis 
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comparable sales were with parking lots not in close proxi-
mity. 
"Q. (Tr. 239). And, did you determine in relation-
ship to them, did you make any determination of 
Stephens when they operated the same. 
A. No, they were not. 
Q. Didn't they, in fact, have one exit and one en-
trance which was controlled. 
A. That is correct." 
It should be further noted that Mr. McDowell's com-
putations were based upon figures for monthly parking which 
had not, nor ever have been charged. 
"Q. (Tr. 246). Tell me what this potential is based 
on, what rate? 
A. That would be based on the rate that they were 
charging on the lot at the time. I based it entirely on 
his lease. 
Q. What was that? 
A. Eight dollars per month. 
Q. Did you talk to Mr. Marsh? Did he ever tell you 
eight dollars per month? 
A. I believe that he did, that is the figure that I have 
here. Just a minute, let me check my notes. That is 
correct. 
Q. Mr. McDowell, Mr. Marsh told you eight dollars 
a month? 
A. So did Mr. Stephens. 
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Q. So you used the basis of eight dollars per monthi 
A. I did. 
Mr. Mash, the lessee, clarified the lease situation some. 
what as follows: 
"Q. (Tr. 176). Were they ever full? 
A. No. 
Q. I am sorry. 
A. We didn't e~pect them to be. 
Q. What was the price you were charging per stall? 
A. In 48 lots, so to speak, originally? 
Q. Any time? 
A. Five dollars per stall monthly. 
Q. Did you ever charge any more than five dollars 
per stall? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Are you aware of the rate that is now being 
charged on the lot? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How much is that? 
A. Four dollars per month, with some daytime park-
ing." 
It should also be pointed out that Mr. Marsh entered 
into the lease, but made no attempt to reflect income or loss 
on his income tax, (Tr. 163), without retaining any receipt 
books, (Tr. 163), without considering the parking operation 
without an attendant, (Tr. 166), and feeling the Bell Park· 
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ing Lot immediately to the west would not result in any com-
petitive detriment. (Tr. 167). 
Although the buildings on Grant Avenue as shown on 
Defendant's exhibit 8 were torn down by the city, and the 
lot extended to the street and to the west as reflected on 
Defendant's Exhibit 6, the actual net income from the inte-
grated parking lot operation, (Tr. 334, 335), did not a.pproach 
that which the defendants' experts had projected for the 
Stephens lot alone. 
The market approach or comparable sales method of 
determining the value of the property was used by all four 
experts. It was generally agreed that proximity in time and 
location are the key factors to be considered. 
The Utah law as set forth in State v. Peek, 1 Utah 2d 
263, 265 P 2d 630, (1953), likewise set forth similar factors 
as follows: 
"Thus the price paid for similar lands, if the time of such 
sale and location of the lands are sufficiently near and 
the sale is made without compulsion is admissible in evi-
dence on direct examination to show the value of lands 
in question. However, even though they do not have to 
be identical in size or shape or ,possible uses, but there 
must be sufficient similarity in these respects and in 
proximity in time of sale and the location of the prop-
erties to satisfy the trial judge that such evidence will be 
helpful to the jury in determining the value of the prop-
erty in question .... Also, evidence of the price paid for 
similar property is admissible on cross examination of 
witnesses who have submitted an opinion of the value 
of the property in question." 
In analyzing the comparable sales used by the experts, 
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the proximity of location of the sales used by the plaintiff's 
witnesses was considered by them as being of considerable 
importance, since even a small distance in one direction or 
another in a commercial downtown district can make a great 
deal of difference in real estate values. (The location of all 
comparables can be seen on plaintiff's exhibit E, the plaintiffs 
with yellow checks, the defendants with orange blocks). They 
felt that an excellent comparable was the Thompson property, 
(Tr. 262), which sold for $1.08 a square foot on May 24, 
1963, (Tr. 256, 316, 351), not 1959 as suggested on page 28 
of appellants' brief. This property was located on the interior 
of the block, had old buildings of no value located on it, had 
no direct frontage on any street, and was accessible from 
Electric Alley - all similar to the Stephens' property. It 
was 91.6 feet directly to the west of the Stephens' property 
with only the Bell property being in between. This was the 
only comparable sale used by any witness which did not have 
frontage on a street the full length or width, whichever the 
case may be, of the property. It was pointed out that on 
Grant A venue if frontage property was of commercially use-
able d~pth, such frontage property would have three times the 
value of an interior lot. (Tr. 268). The Thompson property 
was listed for sale with the Froerer Corporation for any one 
to purchase. (Tr. 259, 356 ). There is no evidence that Ogden 
City was interested in establishing a parking lot at the time 
the property was listed and certainly there was no threat of 
condemnation. 
Another comparable used by plaintiff's witnesses was the 
Green-Cardon property directly north of Stephens' property 
which had two good buildings on it and sold in 1963 for $1.7 5 
or $1.80 per square foot. (Tr. 260, 316). (See defendants' 
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exhibits 17 and 18). 
A third comparable was the Lamph, Anderson and Newey 
property located directly to the south with frontage on both 
Grant Avenue and 25th Street which sold in 1959 for $3.62 
a square foot. (Tr. 255, 314). There were also several com-
mercial establishments and a hotel located in the building on 
the property. The fourth comparable used by both was the 
Malan property which sold in 1961 for 54c per square foot. 
(Tr. 2 61, 316). This comparable was not on the basis of 
proximity of location, but upon being a similarly improved 
parking lot, being a lot operated without an attendant on a 
monthly parking rental basis, being a similar distance from 
the downtown commercial district and being approximately 
the same distance from a Federal Office building-the Malan 
lot being located near the Forest Service Building. In addi-
tion, Mr. Taylor used the Tulatos property in the same block 
as the Stephens' property and Mr. Sears used the Simone 
property adjacent to and directly east of the Stephens' prop-
erty. 
In contrast to the plaintiff's expert witnesses the defend-
ants' expert witnesses used only one comparable that was 
located near the Stephens' property, that one being at 2456 
Grant Avenue on the east side of Grant Avenue with frontage 
and a commercial building located upon it. This sold in 1959 
for $3.06 or $3.00 per square foot. (Tr. 186, 233). 
In comparison of the time of the sales, the other com-
parables used by the witnesses for the defendants were more 
timely, but again, the distance from Stephens' property, leaves 
questions as to whether or not they were actually comparable. 
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In Weber Basin Water Conservancy District v. Ward, 10 
Utah 2d 29, 347 P 2d 862, (1959), the court dealt with the 
question of remoteness in time. The land in question in that 
case had been purchased by the condemnee 6V:! years prior 
to the time of service of summons by the condemnor. The 
court pointed out: 
"The time is not so remote as to eliminate the probative 
value of the price as some evidence to consider in placing 
a fair value upon that land. The more remote the time 
of the prior sale the less probative value it may have on 
the immediate situation, but that goes to the weight of 
the evidence and not its competency or its relevance." 
The appellants, in their testimony and in their brief, have 
expressed and pointed out that potentially the property values 
would raise in the area, and the Federal Building would re· 
suit in an extensive build up in the area. However, in 
referring to the particular area in question, Mr. Fletcher 
testified, "I don't remember seeing anything from the period 
when I first saw the property in the summer of '65 until the 
end of the summer of '66. I don't at the moment recall any 
major changes there. (Tr. 215). 
The only real improvement in the area was after S~tem· 
ber, 1966, when the building to the south was remodeled with 
the Utah State Tax Commission and an attorney's office oc· 
cupying space there. 
There is no evidence that from the inception of the idea 
to build the Federal Building on its present location in 1963, 
through the completion of the building in 1965 or the date of 
taking, May 24, 1965 that land values in the area in question 
had increased. 
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The District Court Judge, upon objection from defend-
ants' counsel, instructed the jury in reference to the date of 
the plaintiff's appraisal as follows: "I will receive the testi-
mony and the jury can judge whether it is sufficiently apt to 
have value or not." (Tr. 266). 
The jury was also instructed regarding the Thompson 
sale: "I receive the evidence unless you can show a forced 
sale relationship. The jury is instructed that if you believe 
that the price was affected by the City's possibility of con-
demning the property in any way, then you should disregard 
it." 
In the final analysis, the jury determined that the plain-
tiff's witnesses were not correct in their total appraisal price 
of $22,000.00. They apparently felt that the values in the 
area had increased regardless of the testimony of plaintiff's 
witnesses and rather than giving the landowner a 10 % per 
year increase as suggested by the defendants' witnesses, they 
gave in excess of a 33 % increase to $34,000.00. 
In regard to the value to be placed on the opinion of 
expert witnesses by the jury, the rule is suggested in 27 Am 
Jur 2d, Eminent Domain, Section 425, pages 317 and 318: 
"The opinions of experts as to value, however, are not 
to be passively received and blindly followed, but are 
to be weighed by the jury and judged in view of all the 
testimony in the case and the jury's own general knowl-
edge of affairs, and are to be given only such considera-
tion as the jury may believe them entitled to receive. It 
has been held that the condemnation verdict or award 
cannot be higher than the highest estimate of the ex.pert 
witnesses nor lower than the lowest." 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondent suggests that this court does not have juris. 
diction to entertain this appeal and submits that Ogden City 
does have the lawful right and authority to take property 
through eminent domain proceedings to establish an off street 
parking lot. 
The respondent further submits that in establishing the 
value of the property taken the expert witnesses for the de· 
fendant in their income analysis used incorrect facts and 
future speculative projections of income which have proven 
unreliable, that the comparable sales used by the plaintiff's 
expert witnesses, were more proximately located on the 
Stephens' property than those used by the defendants and 
gave the jury a more accurate basis on which to determine 
value, that no evidence was available or presented as to any 
) 
recent increase in values of property in the area, that the jury 
was properly instructed regarding any remoteness in time of 
the appraisal, and the jury properly made a determination of 
value not below the lowest appraisal nor in excess of the 
highest. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Carl T. Smith 
Attorney for Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
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